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Abstract. This paper outlines the methodological and empirical limitations of analysing the 
potential relationship between complex social phenomena such as democracy and inequality. It 
shows that the means to assess how they may be related is much more limited than recognised in 
the existing literature that is laden with contradictory hypotheses and findings. Better 
understanding our scientific limitations in studying this potential relationship is important for 
research and policy because many leading economists and other social scientists such as Acemoglu 
and Robinson mistakenly claim to identify causal linkages between inequality and democracy but 
at times still inform policy. In contrast to the existing literature, the paper argues that ‘structural’ 
or ‘causal’ mechanisms that may potentially link the distribution of economic wealth and different 
political regimes will remain unknown given reasons such as their highly complex and idiosyncratic 
characteristics, fundamental econometric constraints and analysis at the macro-level. Neither new 
data sources, different analysed time periods nor new data analysis techniques can resolve this 
question and provide robust, general conclusions about this potential relationship across 
countries. Researchers are thus restricted to exploring rough correlations over specific time 
periods and geographic contexts with imperfect data that are very limited for cross-country 
comparisons. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The objective of this paper is to better understand our methodological and empirical limitations 
of analysing the potential relationship between complex social phenomena such as democracy 
and inequality. Our ability to understand this potential relationship is much more limited than 
recognised in the existing literature. The process of democratisation and changes in levels of 
equality are also more nuanced, idiosyncratic and heterogeneous across and within countries 
over time than commonly expected. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001; 2006), and Boix (2003)—
arguably the most prominent and most cited authors in this literature—claim that high levels of 
inequality decrease the likelihood of democratisation. They also talk about “causal effects” and 
“the impact of democracy” on outcomes. This paper shows that such conclusions presuppose a 
number of very demanding assumptions and requisite premises that cannot be rigorously met. 
 
In fact, thousands of papers analyse the potential relationship between political variables like 
democracy and economic variables like inequality by gathering their data, selecting their 
methods and then going forward with their analysis, interpreting their findings and potentially 
informing policy, with many other steps along the way that involve making important implicit 
methodological assumptions. This paper instead goes backwards to analyse whether the data 
and methods, which are applied by the leading authors in this literature, are even able to 
produce robust results as they claim. It emphasises that how we generate our correlational (or 
‘causal’) claims cannot be viewed independent from how we make everyday, typically 
unreflective decisions as researchers such as what we decide to analyse, how we construct our 
variables, how we collect and use our data, which methods we choose to apply, how we 
interpret our statistical results and so forth. 
 
Better understanding our scientific limits of analysing the potential relationship between 
phenomena like inequality and political regimes is important for research and policy because a 
number of leading economists and other social scientists misguidedly claim to establish causal 
relationships but at times still inform public policy and thus can bring about adverse social 
outcomes. Contrary to the existing literature, the paper here argues that ‘structural’ or ‘causal’ 
mechanisms that may potentially link the distribution of economic wealth and different political 
regimes will remain unknown due to a number of reasons outlined here including, for example, 
their highly complex and idiosyncratic characteristics, fundamental econometric constraints and 
analysis at the macro-level. Neither new data sources, different analysed time periods nor new 
data analysis techniques will resolve this question and provide robust, general conclusions 
about this potential relationship across countries. Researchers can provide at most 
correlational evidence over specific time periods and geographic contexts using imperfect data 
sources which strongly constrain cross-country comparisons. 
 
After this introduction, Section 2 provides a critical review of the leading literature on the 
potential relationship between inequality and democracy—looking at existing studies on how 
inequality may influence democratisation and on how democratisation may influence 
inequality. The paper then outlines the methodological limitations (Section 3) and empirical 
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limitations (Section 4) of trying to analyse either of these two potential relationships. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
 
2. A literature review of the potential relationship between democracy and inequality  
 
A review of the existing literature on how levels of inequality and distribution may be related to 
different political regimes2 shows that it is laden with contradictory hypotheses and findings, 
which constrains the possibility of deriving any general conclusions. 
 
The question about the potential relationship between the distribution of wealth and a 
society’s political system has been explored over the past 2500 years. Aristotle viewed that 
extreme inequalities hinder the functioning of political institutions. Marx argued for the 
allocation of resources in relation to needs, supporting an egalitarian form of distributive 
justice. Moore (1966) highlighted the particular interrelationship between peasants and 
landlords, as well as between landlords and commercial bourgeoisie in influencing the 
democratic, fascist and communist transitions of the early 20th century. 
 
In more recent literature, many theories have been developed that propose that how income is 
distributed influences the probability of democratisation. However, no consensus exists in the 
literature on this potential relationship. Boix (2003) states that no scholar has persuasively 
shown that the distribution of wealth is empirically correlated with a greater likelihood of 
democracy, but claims himself to have identified robust results on this relationship. A number 
of papers argue that cross-country empirical evidence on the potential relationship of 
democracy with inequality can be ambiguous and non-robust (for example, Sirowy and Inkeles 
1990; Gradstein and Milanovic 2004; Acemoglu et al. 2013). Acemoglu et al. (2013) argue that 
empirical evidence illustrates that democracy has no robust effect on inequality while 
democracy can significantly affect tax revenues as a share of GDP (see also Lee 2005). Scheve 
and Stasavage (2009) analyse 13 OECD countries over the period 1916-2000 with country fixed 
effects and argue that they find that the universal right for adults to vote (as a dummy variable) 
did not affect the share of national income that the top 1 percent accrued. Scheve and 
Stasavage (2010; 2012) argue furthermore that democracy has little effect on inequalities and 
on policy across OECD economies. Gil, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2004) argue that in analysing 
a cross section of countries, no relationship exists between democratic regimes and any kind of 
policy outcome.3 
 
While some thus argue that they find no relationship between inequality and democratic 
regimes, others report a negative relationship, a positive relationship or a differentiated 
relationship, which can be explained in part by a multitude of methodological and empirical 
reasons discussed later, together with the different historical periods and different groups of 
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countries that are analysed in each study. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), for example, analyse 
19th-century Europe and 20th-century Latin America and argue that this relationship is 
negative. Lipset (1959), Moore (1966) and Muller (1988) also argue that economic inequalities 
are negatively correlated with democracy. By analysing data over the past two centuries, Boix 
(2003) argues that high levels of equality in income and land ownership have supported 
democracy—especially democratic consolidation. He argues that policies, which make it more 
difficult to tax or expropriate capital, foster a democratic system. Applying pooled OLS 
regressions, Li, Squire and Zou (1998) suggest that an increase in civil liberties is associated with 
a reduction in inequality. 
 
Some papers however report opposite results. Acemoglu et al. (2013) argue that their data 
illustrate an increase in inequality within ex-Soviet countries between 1989 and 1995 (or 2000) 
and within South Africa between 1990 and 2000 (or 2005)—in which democratic transitions 
took place in 1989 and 1994, respectively. They propose that this is in part explained by the 
greater freedom to participate in economic activities that can raise inequality within previously 
marginalised groups that often account for the majority of the population in non-democracies 
(see also Milanovic 1998). 
 
Others argue for a differentiated relationship in which inequality is low in democracies at low 
and high levels of democratisation and inequality is higher at intermediate levels of 
democratisation—for example, Simpson (1990), Burkhart (1997), and Justman and Gradstein 
(1999). In addition, Boix (2003) suggests that countries are more likely to democratise when 
levels of inequality are low. Yet, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001; 2006) suggest that countries 
are more likely to democratise when inequality is neither low nor high but rather at 
intermediate levels, hypothesising that inequality and democratisation have an inverted-U 
relationship. Boix, and Acemoglu and Robinson—as leading authors in this literature—thus 
believe that high levels of inequality decrease the likelihood of democratisation. Moreover, 
while Boix, and Acemoglu and Robinson, view inequality homogeneously (i.e. do not 
differentiate between land, income or other forms of inequality), Ansell and Samuels (2009) 
argue that income inequality and land equality are expected to both have a positive effect on 
democratisation processes. 
 
In terms of redistribution, empirical studies suggest that increased public resources were 
allocated to disadvantaged groups in India, especially landless poor and scheduled castes, once 
they became able to elect their representatives; though, their right to vote did not appear to 
lead to improvements in broad-based services such as education, as the increased public 
resources were largely spent on welfare transfers and government jobs—see Foster and 
Rosenzweig (2001), and Pande (2003). In contrast, Lindert (1994; 2004) analyses OECD 
countries and argues for a linkage between democratisation processes and increased public 
spending, especially in education. Overall, Knack and Keefer (1997) claim to find minimal 
evidence that in countries, in which income inequality is higher, redistribution is higher.4 After 
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reviewing the literature, the paper now outlines the scientific limits of trying to analyse how 
these two phenomena may interact with each other. 
 
 
3. Methodological limitations of analysing the potential relationship between democracy and 
inequality 
 
The paper here argues that neither new data sources, different analysed time periods nor 
different data analysis techniques (e.g. cross-sectional regressions, time-series, panel data 
analyses or any new technique) can resolve the question about potential causal linkages 
between democracy and the distribution of material resources, and the possible direction of 
potential linkages. That this question is irresolvable – and that the existing literature is full of 
conflicting findings – is attributable to a number of methodological reasons. 
 
First, the most common approach among existing studies of analysing one single empirical 
observation per country or per year constrains the possibility of deep and robust analysis 
beyond rough averages, whether comparing over time or across countries (some examples, La 
Porta et al. 1998; Gil et al. 2004; Aidt et al. 2006; for a survey of earlier work see, Sirowy and 
Inkeles 1990). This is a critical methodological constraint because comparisons across countries 
have the very strong assumption that each country would have similar conditions that allow for 
a type of political regime or a specific degree of income distribution to arise; yet, factors such as 
the institutional and regulatory environment, cultural norms and tax structures (to name a few) 
may likely influence both indicators of interest but likely arise idiosyncratically to a given set of 
circumstances in each specific country.5 Some papers attempt to circumvent this 
methodological problem by analysing time-series or panel data and explore if countries which 
become democracies begin redistributing more and reducing inequalities compared to other 
countries (for example, Acemoglu et al. 2013). Such comparisons over time, however, have the 
very demanding assumption that direct and indirect factors that may influence both indicators 
(the type of political regime and the degree of income distribution) would remain the same 
over time—yet, we do not have empirical evidence to support such a strong assumption. 
 
Second, it is not possible to adopt a uniform measure of democracy that can be meaningfully 
comparable across countries given large disparities in the effectiveness and efficiency of 
constitutional laws, access to political participation and power, the media, and other 
democratic institutions. To test for potential correlation between democracy and inequality, a 
dichotomous measure of democracy is generally created. Though, categorising whether 
                                                                                                                                                                           
greater levels of income, wealth or social outcomes relative to changes in levels of equality. That is, irrespective of 
levels of inequality across countries, the bottom 40 percent of the population in democracies likely often have 
greater wealth and social outcomes than the top 60 percent in non-democracies. It is also conceivable that citizens 
in poor countries may tolerate increasing inequality provided that poverty is reducing (i.e. even though income 
levels of the better off would be increasing more rapidly). 
5
 Likewise, most studies assume a median citizen with median political preferences, although the political 
preferences of individual citizens—whether of the poor or non-poor, the disenfranchised or elite—can also likely 
be influenced by a range of idiosyncratic factors. 
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countries are either democratic or not (a 1 or 0 indicator) using some measure or index of 
democracy denies the complexities of democracy with its many shades of grey and forces 
variation into black or white categories. An important limitation of Freedom House and Polity 
indices, which are commonly used to classify countries as democratic or not, is their 
measurement bias and the related spurious changes in classification of countries between 
these categories (see also Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008). The classification of democracies 
remains an ambiguous, arbitrary and disputed exercise. Likewise, there are also discrepancies in 
the way in which inequality and distribution are measured. These indicators range from the 
distribution of wealth or income (for example, the Gini coefficient), the distribution of 
education and health outcomes, to the shares of public funding received by certain sectors and 
groups in society. Some papers apply indirect input-oriented measures of redistribution such as 
tax revenues as a share of GDP—for example, Acemoglu et al. (2013). To measure inequality, 
most studies apply individual- or household-level survey data but these are constrained in being 
representative at the bottom end (the very poor) and top end (the very rich) of the income 
distribution as it is very rare to be able to capture these groups in surveys. In addition, being 
able to compare levels of inequality across countries is based on the important implicit 
assumption of a measure of inequality (such as income Gini coefficient) being able to be 
perfectly standardised across sources and measures. 
 
Third, cross-country regressions—whether controlling for country fixed effects or not—are 
highly confounded with a multitude of variables that would very likely be simultaneously 
correlated with democracy and/or the distribution of income and wealth but are not always 
easily measurable and often cannot be captured in statistical analyses. This means that 
estimations in any such model are very likely biased. Factors that may be simultaneously 
correlated with democracy and inequality include the degree and effectiveness of property 
rights, tax and redistribution policies, the business and investment environment, financial 
regulations, constitutional laws, tax evasion, and other institutions. They may also include the 
level and distribution of education, skills and technology, political conflict and unrest, social 
norms, how demographically homogenous a society is, among many other factors. While some 
of the variables that may influence democracy and inequality may be observable, others are 
unobserved and unobservable. This, together with the possibility of potential influences going 
in both directions (from democracy to inequality and vice versa), are common econometric 
constrains in analysing  this potential relationship. 
 
Omitted variable bias – which can severely constrain the usefulness of results – exists among 
the most well-known empirical analyses. For example, Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) argue that 
differences between English common law and French civil law help explain differences in social 
and economic outcomes between these countries and their colonies—with common law 
associated with lay judges, general legal principles, and verbal arguments, while civil law relies 
on professionalised judges, and specific legal codes and records. Yet, it is possible that other 
factors not analysed may explain the differences in social and economic outcomes such as the 
greater priority on trade among England and its colonies. Similarly, Frye and Shleifer (1997) 
explore the reform packages of Russia and Poland in the 1990s that included privatisation, price 
and trade liberalisation, and macroeconomic stabilisation. They conclude that the response of 
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the Polish economy was much better despite similar reform packages because of a much 
friendlier legal and regulatory environment for entrepreneurs (ibid.). Yet, it is just as likely that 
Poland’s geographic location directly bordering Western Europe and its associated market 
access and greater mobility of capital may explain much of its economic success, so that any 
estimated correlation between the performance of businesses and the legal/regulatory 
environment may likely just be a story of geographic proximity to the European Union. In 
another empirical study, La Porta et al. (1998) conduct a cross-country analysis of the potential 
sources of the quality of government and government performance, applying proxy measures 
of government intervention, government size, efficiency of the public sector, delivery of public 
goods, and political freedom. They argue that countries that perform weaker on such measures 
tend to be poorer, exhibit French or socialist legal systems, or have closer proximity to the 
equator. They propose that exogenous historical variables such as ethno-linguistic 
heterogeneity, religious affiliation and legal origins systematically affect government 
performance. However, it may be likely that government performance may be influenced 
largely by, and in combination with, other factors ranging from the level of exports to the 
degree of urban density that are not captured by the authors. 
 
Fourth, endogeneity is a standard constraint afflicting analyses of the potential relationship 
between democracy and inequality. La Porta et al. (1998)—like other leading authors 
conducting aggregate, macro analyses on the quality of government—generally suffer from this 
statistical problem as they neglect the possibility of potential influences going in both directions 
between their independent variables (such as GNP per capita) and their dependent variables 
(such as school attainment or infrastructure quality). Another example is that controlling for 
both the universal right to vote and education in a model estimating their potential effects on 
the top income shares—such as in Scheve and Stasavage (2009)—would show that democratic 
participation may not be correlated with income inequality if democracy would affect income 
inequality through its potential effect on education. In turn, excluding education as a control 
may overestimate potential effects of democracy on equality or inequality, as democracy would 
then possibly be capturing these potential effects as well. Endogeneity also applies to the other 
common control variables, whether continuous variables such as per capita GDP, or binary 
variables such as democracy/dictatorship or parliamentary system/presidential system. 
Attempting to circumvent such econometric constraints by selecting some instrument for 
democracy can be arbitrary and ambiguous and has its own demanding assumptions. 
 
Fifth, many econometric models exploring the potential effect of democracy on inequality 
include independent variables such as universal suffrage, per capita GDP, education, and the 
size of the informal sector; yet, potential effects of these different variables on inequality would 
likely take place at different time periods and experience different time lags. That is, adopting 
the universal right to vote may influence inequality in the short term in some countries that 
may consequently implement immediate distribution policies, but in other countries potential 
effects of democracy on inequality may take decades to take place or may not have any effect. 
The dynamic, time-variant characteristics of the observed variables thus compound the 
problems of analysis. 
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Sixth, taking democracy and inequality – or any two social phenomena – and making them 
quantifiable and thus amendable for statistical analysis and probabilistic claims does not mean 
that they must be directly correlated in the real world outside of statistical models. In a quest 
for causal truth, many scholars have (implicitly) turned to the idea of probabilistic causation, 
the idea that a potential cause (for example, lower levels of inequality) can raise the probability 
of a potential effect (for example, democratisation) while controlling for ‘everything’ else. The 
main concept of the theory of probabilistic causality is that if including an assumed cause 
(relative to excluding it) would make a difference in the likelihood of an assumed effect while 
controlling for ‘all’ confounding factors (which would affect both the independent and 
dependent variables) then a researcher would be able to make the claim that it probabilistically 
‘caused’ the assumed effect among at least some observations in the sample within a given 
statistical model. The theoretical idea behind probabilistic causality presupposes that 
probabilistic differences captured in a statistical model should have a causal reason and under 
the condition that we would be able to control for every other potential cause (which is not 
possible), then the specific cause of interest must be the causal reason for the difference in 
probability at least for some observations in the collected sample. We must adopt some such 
assumption to be able to assume that we can derive correlational or ‘causal’ claims from 
differences in probability among a set of collected observations of variables that we make 
quantifiable such as democracy and inequality.6 In this context it is thus not sensible to talk 
about ‘causes’, but rather that two phenomena can be mutually correlated within a statistical 
model and that they may possibly be mutually correlated in the real world outside. 
 
Beyond these outlined methodological constraints, scientific analysis is furthermore subject to 
a number of other methodological issues related to, for example, data collection, selection bias, 
data analysis and how derived results are interpreted. 
 
 
4. Empirical limitations of analysing the potential relationship between democracy and 
inequality 
 
The discrepancies in the findings among existing empirical studies and the irresolvability of the 
question about a robust relationship between democracy and the distribution of material 
resources are not only related to methodological constraints but also to a number of associated 
empirical complexities. 
 
First, the degree and type of democracy, inequality and overall wealth appear distinct to 
conditions within individual countries. Some democratic regimes may fulfil some basic criteria 
such as free and fair elections. Other democratic regimes may fulfil some further criteria such 
as the establishment of constitutional laws and institutions. And other democratic regimes may 
fulfil some more complex criteria such as the protection of property rights and contracts, 
established social norms and practices, and broad citizen participation in a legitimate, 
responsive and equitable process of public service provision. Likewise, the degree of income 
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inequality and the level of income may likely influence democracy differently. In some countries 
inequality may be pervasive in fixed assets like land owned by ruling economic or political elite. 
In other countries inequality may exist due to disparities between economic sectors, or due to 
differences in the pace of growing sectors such as manufacturing or industry. In another set of 
countries inequality may be pervasive in physical capital or in other forms of social, economic or 
political assets. The potential relationship would thus likely be sensitive to even small 
differences in levels of inequality or democratisation between countries, and differences would 
very likely exist on both variables across any two countries. 
 
Second, not only may different types of political regimes influence the distribution of wealth 
differently but also the specific laws, institutions and policies that are implemented by a 
particular political regime. The degree of functionality of a democracy may depend on the 
existing parties and the judiciary, and how conservative these are, and on the type of 
constitution. It may be influenced by how liberal the financial sector is—for example, in terms 
of the possibility for capital flight—and thus also by the degree of tax evasion. It may depend on 
potential threats of coups and on the extent to which aspects of a de jure democratic system 
are de facto influenced by local law enforcement, and military and non-state armed actors 
(Acemoglu et al. 2013). Nonetheless, while some authoritarian regimes appear to support some 
form of pro-poor policy, nearly all democratic regimes appear to support such policy, as 
democratisation can help broaden political power to the poor. Poverty reduction—if levels of 
income of the non-poor remain unchanged—would inevitably reduce inequality, but levels of 
income of the non-poor can often increase more rapidly than those of the poor, so that poverty 
reduction can often be correlated with increased inequality. Thus, even though pro-poor 
policies are necessarily connected to redistribution, they are likely often not enough to reduce 
inequality.7 
 
Third, democratic institutions may help distribute de jure political power in society (Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2006), while inequality may also be influenced by how power may be de facto 
distributed which can be much more difficult in assessing empirically. The specific policies and 
institutions that a political regime produces may be related to how power among groups in 
society is distributed, how institutions and interest groups are able to aggregate preferences, 
how constraints to collective action are overcome (Acemoglu et al. 2013), the social norms 
about the level of distribution that is acceptable and desirable and, among other factors, how 
current economic resources are distributed. In many contexts it is nonetheless likely that the 
group in a democratic society that accounts for the largest share of the population—whether 
the working class, the poor, the middle class or another group—may have an advantage in 
exercising power and influencing the level and type of redistribution. 
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legitimate, responsive and democratic process of generating and distributing wealth and in the process of 
acquiring skills required to do so (Sen 2009). This process may indirectly take place through means that enable 
citizens to make complaints about basic public services, and governments taking action to improve these services, 
or may indirectly take the form of representation in parliament. 
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Fourth, democratic institutions may experience different degrees of capture by economic and 
political elite and interest groups, which may affect different degrees of representation of 
segments of the population. An example are the economic lobby groups in a number of 
democracies, against which societal groups often protest, for example, in favour of greater 
regulation or redistribution. By its very character, information on capture is not easy to obtain 
and include in empirical studies. 
 
Fifth, empirical analyses on this potential relationship may be further constrained due to the 
types of tax structures and levels of taxation that vary widely across different political regimes 
and thus also the distribution of income and assets. Wealthier citizens in a given society may at 
times have stronger financial incentives to resist transition towards democratic institutions 
while poorer citizens may have stronger financial incentives to support such a transition, as 
democracies often allow for the majority to progressively levy higher taxes on the better off. 
Ansell and Samuels (2009) argue that countries are more likely to democratise when growing 
economic groups could lose more from expropriation under autocracy than from taxation 
under democracy. That is, some well-off citizens may weigh the costs of paying taxes in a more 
distributive political system relative to the costs of repression in a less distributive political 
system. The potential redistributive effects of different political regimes may thus be in conflict 
with each other. In right-wing authoritarian regimes, public transfers are often low and taxes 
are often more restricted to funding military, police and administrative services. While in some 
authoritarian regimes taxes are redistributed more broadly and include a range of public 
services, this is the case in nearly all democratic regimes. Among revolutionary regimes, 
nationalising citizens’ assets may support the establishment of central planning governments 
which may often lack transparent political accountability and may often support corruption and 
economic stagnation given state monopoly and limited economic competition (Boix 2003). In 
addition, corporate tax rates have been declining globally,8 as democracies appear increasingly 
under pressure to reduce such tax rates as capital becomes more mobile across borders. 
Taxation thus appears highly nuanced and complexly related to democracy which further limits 
econometric analysis. 
 
Sixth, democratisation may often foster an increase in tax revenue, redistribution and income, 
and greater access to skills and market opportunities; yet, while greater redistribution may 
reduce inequalities, an increase in skills and market opportunities and in income may likely 
reach certain groups first as not all groups in society take equal advantage of skills and market 
opportunities. In such contexts, democracy may possibly be correlated with greater inequality. 
Likewise, processes of democratisation may likely often take place at the same time as 
processes of human and economic development, from which exporting sectors and 
geographically advantaged populations may be more likely to benefit first, implying that 
democratisation would be associated with increased inequality. This may even be the case in 
countries with strong tax and distribution systems, as any potential effects of these systems on 
inequality may likely be delayed depending on particular adopted policies and furthermore the 
level of efficiency and effectiveness varies widely across countries in collecting taxes and 
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distributing public resources. This additionally constrains the standard approach of cross-
country comparison. 
 
Given that country experiences with democratisation processes and changes in levels of 
equality are highly nuanced and may be associated with a multitude of endogenous conditions, 
there are examples throughout history of all types of authoritarian and democratic regimes that 
appear to have provided limited as well as strong support for more equitable distribution of 
material resources. Some authoritarian regimes passed aggressive land reforms that helped 
redistribute land from large land owners to poor farmers such as in South Korea and Venezuela 
in the 20th century. Some democratic regimes redistribute wealth through large-scale 
conditional cash transfer schemes for poorer households funded with tax revenue from more 
well-off households such as in Brazil and Mexico. While both democratic and authoritarian 
regimes have lifted millions out of poverty, the authoritarian Government of China has arguably 
been the most successful single government in history to reduce monetary poverty. 
 
Overall, the methodological limitations together with the empirical limitations of analysing the 
potential relationship between democracy and inequality fundamentally constrain the 
formulation of theoretical explanations and general conclusions about how they may be 
related. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The ability to acquire knowledge about the potential relationship between political variables 
like democracy and economic variables like inequality is much more limited than understood in 
the existing literature. This potential relationship may appear positive or negative, stronger or 
weaker, differentiated or non-existent and to vary across and within countries and time periods 
but fundamental methodological and empirical limitations of analysis outlined here do not 
allow us to make such claims robustly. This is to some extent because the process of 
democratisation and of changes in levels of equality are highly nuanced, heterogeneous, 
difficult to capture econometrically and at times may possibly be random. 
 
The lack of being able to establish ‘causal mechanisms’ or even a robust correlation between 
democracy and inequality is due to a number of critical scientific constraints outlined here. The 
main methodological limitations outlined include aggregate macro-level analysis using a single 
empirical observation per country or per year, creating a uniform and meaningfully comparable 
measure of democracy, the multitude of non-measurable factors that may simultaneously 
influence the independent and dependent variables, the difficulties of applying control 
variables that do not influence each other (endogeneity), likely different time lags in the 
potential effects of the influencing variables, and important assumptions behind correlational 
claims derived from statistical analysis. The main empirical limitations of analysing this potential 
relationship include trying to make meaningful comparisons across and within countries over 
different time periods despite very different degrees and types of democracy and inequality, 
and country-specific policies, different levels of distribution of de jure and de facto political 
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power, different degrees of elite capture and, among other factors, heterogeneity in the types 
of tax structures and levels of taxation. 
 
The limitations are particularly strong when trying to quantify democracy because whether 
democracy improves or worsens cannot be easily measured – especially compared to more 
quantifiable ‘up-down’ indicators such as whether income levels, access rates to public services 
or inflation increase or reduce. Given that democracy is an overarching concept encompassing 
the functioning of a range of difficult to measure institutions together with a number of 
observable, unobserved and unobservable factors outlined above, there are fundamental 
constraints in statistically capturing its potential relationship with most variables, not just 
inequality, but also poverty, education, economic output etc. Since we have been largely 
restricted in obtaining robust data with within-country variation on levels of democracy, 
researchers have focused largely on cross-country analysis. It is however, in particular, the 
variations between democratic institutions across countries that are too large to be 
meaningfully comparable from an econometric and methodological perspective. Also, 
especially because democracy is generally a macro variable aggregately captured with a single 
observation per year or country, such analysis is statistically constrained to very rough 
correlations. It is important to stress that dynamic social phenomena like democracy do not 
have an ‘intrinsic nature’, they do not abide by ‘social laws’. It thus may not always seem very 
scientifically useful to compare an aggregate concept as broad and qualitative as democracy 
across countries or analyse it within a country over time. 
 
Researchers interested in continuing to explore this potential relationship and trying to reduce 
the number of associated assumptions and limitations may consider: abandoning the standard 
approach of conducting cross-country analysis at the aggregate or macro level altogether and 
thus letting go of trying to make meaningful comparisons across countries; focusing instead on 
analysing micro-level data of intra-country variation among specific aspects of both democracy 
and inequality to try and reduce some (but will not be able to reduce all) of the unobservables 
outlined above; and including thereby survey questions into individual- or household-level 
surveys to capture such specific aspects of democracy and inequality among the same 
individual respondents. This way (more modest) scholars may try to understand how one single 
aspect of democracy may be related to one single aspect of inequality, for example trying to 
analyse nationally representative individual-level data over time within one country that 
underwent democratisation by comparing the levels of individuals’ annual consumption or 
income with a measure of the political participation of the same individuals (such as having 
voted or placed a complaint about public services or a politician) or with a measure of the 
effectiveness of their political institutions (such as if they placed a complaint did officials 
addressed it, or if their property rights are being enforced). Even if researchers were to restrict 
themselves to such a micro-level statistical approach it would still not be possible to establish a 
‘causal’ link between these two factors as comparisons over time also bring with them very 
demanding assumptions such as for example that direct and indirect factors that may influence 
both ‘precise’ indicators would remain identical over time which would be very unlikely. But 
with such micro-level, country-specific analysis the correlations may possibly be stronger than 
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cross-country correlations, even if the data and methods do not allow us to say anything about 
causality. 
 
The paper argues that no kind of theoretical framework (no unified causal theory, no multiple 
causal paths or anything else) is able to capture a causal connection between democracy and 
inequality. We need to abandon the vocabulary expressing causation – such as that used by 
leading scholars like Acemoglu et al. (2013) and Boix (2003) about “causal effects” and “the 
impact of democracy”. The dilemma that arises is that statistical analysis can only provide 
rough probabilities while research aiming to inform public policy often demands greater 
certainty and prediction even though it is not econometrically possible. Given the limits in 
making democracy quantifiably amendable to scientific inquiry the study of democratic 
institutions across countries is generally less of a quantitative science and more of a qualitative 
narrative or art. 
 
Overall, researchers have been constrained in producing meaningful results that are useful for 
policy and they need to be more critical and transparent in explicitly outlining the limitations of 
the data and methods they apply, and about the precision and interpretation of their results. 
The hope of the paper is to possibly be a useful warning for researchers against overly 
ambitious research aims and the overselling of their estimated results. Given the combination 
of limitations outlined here, it is argued that research on the potential relationship between the 
distribution of economic wealth and different political regimes remains largely limited to basic 
descriptive correlation analysis over specific time periods and geographic contexts with 
imperfect data that are very limited for cross-country comparisons. Though, not even these 
methods provide much hope for robust, general conclusions about this potential relationship 
across countries. 
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